Bargaining agenda in a unionised monopoly with network effects by Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Bargaining agenda in a unionised
monopoly with network effects
Luciano Fanti and Domenico Buccella
University of Pisa, Kozminski University, Warsaw
2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64090/
MPRA Paper No. 64090, posted 2. May 2015 23:46 UTC
1 
 
Bargaining agenda in a unionised monopoly with network effects. 
 
    Luciano Fanti
* 
 and Domenico Buccella 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the bargaining agenda selection in a unionised monopoly with 
network effects. In contrast with the established result that monopolist always prefers 
Right-To-Manage (RTM), it is shown that monopolist prefers Sequential Efficient 
Bargaining (SEB), provided that the network effect is sufficiently intense and union’s 
power not too high. Since the union always prefers SEB, the presence of network 
effects may solve the traditional conflict of interests between parties and allow the 
achievement of the highest social welfare. Moreover, if the monopolist can choose 
the agenda, it may strategically commit either to RTM or SEB or EB to deter market 
entry, depending on the network intensity and thus all agendas are an effective device 
as a barrier to entry. Furthermore, with endogenous agenda’s selection, the parties 
may agree on SEB, provided that the network effects are intense and the union’s 
power not excessively low. The social welfare under duopoly with SEB is the Pareto-
superior outcome. However, the SEB institution may deter entry in specific cases. 
Thus, the SEB institution itself may prevent the most desirable welfare outcome but 
in any case it remains socially preferred to RTM and EB. 
 
Keywords: Efficient bargaining; Right-to-manage; Firm-union bargaining agenda; 
Network effects 
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Introduction 
 
The issue of bargaining agenda has been recently investigated by some works in an 
oligopoly context, such as Bughin (1999), Buccella (2011) and Fanti (2014,2015). 
Such papers have shown mixed results, but all of them supposed that goods have no 
consumption/network externalities. However, a recent growing literature has shown 
that the effects of network externalities may be relevant, and many established results 
of the industrial organization literature, obtained basically by assuming non-network 
goods, may be modified. For instance, Hoernig (2012), Battacharjee and Pal (2014), 
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and Chirco and Scrimitore (2013) have shown that the established results of the 
oligopoly managerial delegation literature may be changed in the presence of network 
externalities.  
In fact, it is known that for many products the utility derived by one consumer 
increases with the number of other consumers of that goods, that is, the  total sales of 
the goods enhance the welfare of each consumer.
1
  
Therefore, the consumers’ expectations about the total sales of the goods may be in 
principle affected by different mechanisms of output decisions and different 
production costs, and thus by different labour market institutions. 
Despite the possible relevance of positive consumption externalities, issues pertaining 
to network goods industries, to the best of our knowledge, have largely been ignored 
in the literature on unionised industries. A classical result in the unionised firm 
literature is that profits when firms bargain only over wage and choose employment 
(Right-To-Manage, RTM) are higher than when they bargain also over employment 
(simultaneous or sequential Efficient Bargaining). This is true particularly as regards 
a unionised monopoly in which strategic competitive effects are absent and thus wage 
costs (depending on the specific alternative bargaining arrangements)  can never used 
as a strategic device, as it may occur, under specific conditions, under oligopolistic 
competition (e.g. Vannini and Bughin, 2000). Then we consider here the monopoly 
case where the network effects on the choice of the agenda cannot be obfuscated, as 
regards the firm, by indirect strategic competitive effects. Moreover, another 
conventional result is that unions always prefer  the EB agenda and thus a (possibly 
unpleasant) conflict of interest between parties always occurs.  
Moreover it is natural to think that the choice of bargaining agenda may exert some 
influence on the behaviour of incumbents and entrants, although the investigation of 
this theme is rather scant. Exceptions are Bughin (1999) and Buccella (2011), but 
they abstract from the possibility of consumption externality. 
Therefore, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: does the 
conventional result that under monopoly firms always prefer RTM to Efficient 
Bargaining (with a corresponding conflict of interests between firm and union) holds 
true in the presence of network effects? What happens if there is the threat of market 
entry in the industry? May the incumbent strategically select the agenda to deter entry? 
Which are the consequences in terms of social welfare?  
The answers reveal that network effects may revert the established results of the 
previous literature. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
monopoly-union bargaining model. Section 3 analyses the issue of potential entry and 
                                                 
1
 Typical  examples of network goods are telephone and software: it is natural to observe that the 
utility of a particular consumer from using a telephone or a software  increases with the number of 
other telephone or software users.  More in general positive network externality may exist for those 
products which a consumer wishes to possess in part because others do (i.e. the so-called  
Bandwagon Effect), for instance products of fashion industry. 
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discusses the welfare implications. Finally, the last section summarises the main 
results and suggests directions for further research on the subject.   
 
2. The model 
 
The simple mechanism of network effects assumed here is that the surplus a firm’s 
client obtains increases directly with the number of other clients of this firm (i.e. Katz 
and Shapiro (1985)).  
We assume that, following, for instance, Hoernig (2012), Battacharjee and Pal (2014) 
and Chirco and Scrimitore (2013), the monopolist firm faces the following linear 
direct demand: 
nypaq       (1) 
where q denotes the quantity of the goods produced, y denotes the consumers' 
expectation about monopolist’s equilibrium production, the parameter n  [0; 1) 
indicates the strength of  network effects (i.e., the higher the value of the parameter 
the stronger the network effects). 
The inverse demand function is: 
nyqap        (2) 
where p is the price of goods. The monopolist’s profit function is: 
qwp )(  ,   (3) 
where w is the wage per unit of output. 
The efficient bargaining may be either simultaneous over wage and employment (EB) 
(Nickell and Andrews,1983) or sequential, first over wage and then over employment 
(SEB) (Manning, 1987a,b).  
In the RTM and SEB cases, monopolist’s decisions are taken in two stages. In the 
first stage, both in the RTM and SEB cases, the monopolist-union unit bargains over 
wages w  to maximise the Nash product. In the second stage 1) with RTM, the 
monopolist chooses the quantity q (alternatively, the price p) to maximise profits, 2) 
with SEB, the monopolist-union unit negotiates over the quantity q  (alternatively, the 
price p) to maximise the Nash product. On the other hand, under EB, the monopolist-
union unit bargains simultaneously over wages w and quantity q  to maximise the 
Nash product. 
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985) and the above mentioned literature, we impose 
the additional “rational expectations” conditions, i.e.  y= q,  in Stage 2. 
As usual, our equilibrium concept is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, and we 
solve this game by the backward induction method. 
The union utility function is lwwV )(   (e.g. Pencavel, 1985), where l is 
employment and w° the reservation wage. Given the standard assumption of constant 
returns to labour, q=l, it follows that .)( qwwV   
In the next sections we analyses the cases of RTM, SEB and EB, respectively. 
 
2.1 RTM institution 
 
4 
 
At stage 2, solving the monopolist’s profit maximisation problem, we obtain the 
following output function, for given consumers’ expectations: 
  
2
),(
nywa
wyq

      (4) 
Solving (4) by imposing the “rational expectations” condition, y= q, the equilibrium 
quantities at stage 2 are: 
   
 
n
wa
wq



2
)(     (5) 
 
At the first stage of the game, under RTM, the monopolist - union bargaining unit 
selects w to maximise the following generalised Nash product, 
 
        
1 1
. . .
max ( )
bb b b
w r t w
N V a w q nq q w w q
 
        (6),  
where b  represents the  union’s bargaining power.  
After substitution of (5) in (6), maximisation of (6) w.r.t. w leads to: 
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Thus, the equilibrium outcomes are 
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n
     
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2.2. Efficient Bargaining institution. 
 
Under efficient bargaining the monopolist-union bargaining unit maximises the 
following generalised Nash product, 
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       
1 1
( ) ( )
b b bb
N V a w q ny q w w q
 
         (13).  
Hence, the monopolist - union unit selects 1) in the case of SEB, in the first stage w  
and in the second stage l , or equivalently q; 2) in the case of EB, simultaneously w 
and q. 
 
2.2.1.  Sequential Efficient Bargaining  
At second stage, from the first-order condition (FOC) of the efficient bargaining 
game between monopolist and union, one gets the monopolist’s output function: 
    wnya
b
wyq 


2
1
, . (14) 
     
    From (14), after imposing the “rational expectations” condition, we obtain the 
output level for given w: 
 ( )
2
a w
q w
n b


 
      (15) 
 
In the first stage, after substitution of (15) in (13), the usual maximisation procedure 
w.r.t. w leads to  
(2 )
2
SEB ab w bw
  
      (16) 
The equilibrium outcomes are 
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8(2 )
SEB b a w n b nSW
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2.2.2.  Simultaneous Efficient Bargaining  
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From the system of FOCs of the EB game between monopolist and union, we obtain: 
    wnya
b
wyq 


2
1
, , (22) 
   )()1(, qanybbwqyw   (23) 
     
    After imposing the “rational expectations” condition, and solving the system (22)-
(23), we obtain the following wage and output, respectively: 
2
EB a wq
n
 


      (24) 
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The equilibrium outcomes are    
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n
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
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Preliminarily, we remark the standard situation with demand without externalities. 
 
Remark. In the standard case without network externalities, a monopolist always 
gains larger profits with RTM rather than SEB and EB, and profits are the same 
irrespective of whether the timing of the efficient bargaining is sequential or 
simultaneous. 
 
Now, based on the equilibrium outcomes for the alternative bargaining agendas 
above presented, we analyse whether and how the conventional results are modified 
by the presence of network effects in consumption. 
 
Lemma 1. Under the presence of network effects, monopolist always prefers to 
bargain sequentially rather than simultaneously in the case of EB institution. 
Proof: 0;0  nn EBSEBEBSEB  . 
 
Lemma 2. Under the presence of network effects, both RTM and SEB wages are 
equal between them  and lower than EB wages. Moreover RTM and SEB wages are 
independent on n, while EB wages are increasing with n.  
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Proof: By simple inspection of  (7), (16) and (25). 
The economic intuition behind Lemmas above is that in the presence of network 
externality, the profits with SEB are higher than EB because the consumers’ 
expectations on the market size are already realised when the wage is bargained at the 
first stage; thus, the SEB wage is independent of n. On the other hand, in the 
simultaneous EB game, where the wage and employment are concurrently 
determined, the consumers’ expectations are not so far realised and the externality 
effect has a positive impact on the bargained wage. As a consequence, it follows that 
EB SEBw w .  A plausible explanation could be as follows. In the SEB case, the union 
may find optimal to agree a wage such that the firm can adapt employment to market 
conditions. On the other hand, in the case of EB, consumers’ expectations are not 
immediately realised; therefore, the union would trade off  part of this uncertainty on 
product demand with network externalities for higher wages. 
 
Result 1. In contrast with the conventional wisdom, a monopolist prefers SEB rather 
than RTM provided that the network effect is sufficiently high. Moreover, the lower 
the union’s power, the more likely a monopolist prefers SEB.  
 
Proof: 1)
22
22
)2()2(4
)()2))(2((
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nbn
wabnnbbSEBRTM

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3) 01 
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n
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Result 1 is graphically illustrated in Fig. 1 below. 
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Fig. 1. Plot of the “threshold curve” =0   in [n,b]-space . 
Legend: The curve is drawn for a=1, w°=0. For all {n, b} combinations along the 
curve 21 (1 )b n   , 1 = 0 holds true. For all {n, b} combinations above (below) 
the curve, profits are higher under RTM (SEB) arrangement (that is, 1>(<) 0 ). 
 
Result 1 reverts the conventional result as regards the preferred agenda by firms and 
is worth to be commented more in detail. At first glance, the finding that 0



 
seems to be puzzling because RTM SEBw w   and RTM SEBq q . Moreover, it is also valid 
that RTM SEBp p  in the  [n,b]-space. A closer analytical inspection reveals that the 
monopolist, in equilibrium, produces on a point of the demand curve where the price 
elasticity of demand is larger under RTM than SEB, that is  ( , ) ( , )RTM SEBn b n b   . 
Depending on the values of  [n,b], the elasticity (and mark-up) differential may 
increase or decrease; as a consequence, the price effects may dominate or not the 
quantity effects on the monopolist revenues. Fig.1 tells us that when 1>(<) 0, the 
price effect dominates (is dominated by) the effect on quantity variation.
2
    
 
                                                 
2
 Analytically, we can describe this result as follows. Let us define the additional marginal revenues 
differential under the two bargaining agendas as [( )]RTM RTM SEB SEBR MR dq MR dq   . The latter 
expression can be developed and re-arranged in the following way: 
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( ( , ) ( , )) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
( , ) ( , )
RTM SEB
RTM SEB RTM SEB RTM SEB
RTM SEB
dp n b dp n b
R n b p n b p n b q n b q n b dq dq
dq n b dq n b
  
       
  
. 
Fig.1 shows that in the area of the ( , )n b  space where 1 ( )0   , the combination of the 
parameters is such that the price differential effect between the two agendas dominates (is 
dominated by) the effect on the quantity variation. 
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Lemma 3. Union always prefers, as expected, SEB rather than RTM. Otherwise, it 
may prefer SEB rather than EB provided that its union’s power is high enough. 
Proof: 
2(2 )
0; 0
4
RTM SEB EB SEB nV V V V b
n
  
   
  
. 
 
Result 2. When network effects are sufficiently intense, the monopolist and the union 
agree on the SEB agenda.  
 
Result 3. Consumers and society as a whole always prefers SEB rather than EB and 
RTM.  
Proof: 0;SEB RTMCS CS n   0SEB EBCS CS n   ; 0;SEB EBSW SW n    
0SEB RTMSW SW n   . 
 
Result 4. Provided that the network effect is sufficiently high, the SEB arrangement is 
Pareto-superior (i.e. monopolist, workers and consumers prefers it). The proof 
follows from the previous Lemmas and Results. 
 
To sum up, network effects may be responsible for the elimination of the unpleasant 
conflict about the bargaining agenda between parties and the occurrence of a pleasant 
Pareto-superior choice.  
The policy implication is that these novel findings may be useful for a better 
understanding of what happens in unionised network goods industries and for the 
achievement of an optimal labour market arrangement.  
 
3 Monopoly with threat of entry 
 
In the previous subsections, we have analysed the endogenous choice of the 
bargaining between the monopolist and its union, but we have considered the 
monopoly as the given market structure. In the following, we investigate the topic of 
the bargaining agenda selection in the context of market entry. As benchmark, we 
consider the case where the firm selects the agenda, and then the we consider the 
endogenous choice. 
In the traditional case of standard (i.e. not network) goods the strategic choice of the 
bargaining agenda for different market structures, namely duopoly vs. monopoly with 
threat of entry, has been studied by Bughin (1999) and Buccella (2011). Those 
authors consider that the institutional arrangements in the labour market are the 
simultaneous EB and the RTM agenda. They analyse different entry modes and 
constraints on the choice of bargaining scope: 1) committed bargaining, where the 
incumbent firm chooses the bargaining agenda; then, the entrant “joins the pack” and 
adopts the agenda of the incumbent; and 2) flexible bargaining, where the entrant 
freely chooses the agenda. 
Their results are mixed: while Bughin (1999) argues that, under a unionised Cournot 
duopoly the EB agenda arises as the industry equilibrium for each firm, Buccella 
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(2011), by contrast, shows that a conflict of interest among the parties arises 
concerning the bargaining agenda (i.e. when the duopoly is the given market structure, 
RTM is the firms’ dominant strategy while EB is the unions’ dominant strategy). 
Nonetheless, in the case of threat of entry, the incumbent bargaining parties can agree 
on the EB agenda to deter the market entry of a potential competitor. 
In the present paper, differently from the previous works, we consider goods with the 
characteristic of having positive externalities in consumption (the network effects). 
Moreover, we consider three institutional arrangements, that is, the RTM agenda, and 
the EB agenda, both in the simultaneous and sequential form. However, for simplicity, 
we restrict the analysis to the case of monopoly with threat of entry with committed 
bargaining. 
The game, as usual, is solved by backward induction to derive sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibria. The timing of the game is the following. In the first stage, the incumbent 
firm/union pair chooses which bargaining agenda to introduce into negotiations, that 
is, either EB or RTM. In the second stage, given the committed bargaining, the 
entrant firm/union pair adopts the agenda of the incumbent pair. In the third stage, the 
potential entrant unit decides whether to enter in the industry and conduct the 
negotiations according to the agenda of the incumbent pair. In the last stages, 
depending on the agenda, the sequence is as follows. In the case of RTM, first, each 
firm-union bargaining unit simultaneously negotiates over wages (given the output 
chosen by firms); and then, firms simultaneously choose their output level (given the 
wages bargained with the unions). On the other hand, under the sequential efficient-
bargaining the union and the management of the firm negotiate the wages and 
employment at different stages. First, each firm-union pair negotiates over wages; in 
the second stage, each union-firm pair bargains the employment level (given the 
previously bargained wages). Finally, under the simultaneous efficient bargaining, 
the union and the management of the firm negotiate the wages and employment at the 
same time. 
We define firm 1 as the incumbent and firm 2 the potential entrant. In duopoly, the 
demand function becomes 
 
1 2 1 2( )p a q q n y y              (30) 
 
 The firms’ profit function are 
 
1 1 1( )p w q                (31) 
 
2 2 2( )p w q E                (32) 
 
for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. The term E  represents an exogenous 
fixed cost the entrant faces. On the other hand, the union utility function is  
 
( ) 1,2.i i iV w w q i              (33) 
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In the following we analyse the cases of RTM, SEB and EB, respectively. 
 
3.1 Duopoly with RTM 
 
Given eq. (30) and imposing the additional “rational expectations” conditions, i.e.  
, 1,2i iy q i  , the firm maximization problem under RTM leads to 
 
(1 )
, , 1,2
2
i j
i
a w n q
q i j i j
n
  
  

               (34) 
 
Solving the system of equations in (34), the firms’ output decision as function of the 
wages are 
 
(2 ) (1 )
, , 1,2
3 2
i j
i
a n w n w
q i j i j
n
   
  

      (35) 
 
At the previous stage of the game, under RTM, the each firm - union bargaining unit 
chooses w to maximise the following generalised Nash product, 
 
      
11
. . .
max ( ( ))
i
b bb b
i i i i j i j i i i
w r t w
N V a w q q n q q q w w q

                    (36)  
 
where b  represents the  union’s bargaining power. After substitution of (35) in (36), 
maximisation of  w.r.t. w leads to: 
 
[ (1 ) (2 ) ] 2(2 )
, , 1,2
4 2
i
i
a n w n w b n w
w i j i j
n
       
  

    (37) 
 
Solving the system of equations in (37), the equilibrium wages are 
 
/ 2 ( ) (4 ) , 1,2
4 2 (1 )
RTM RTM
i
ab w n b w bn
w i j
n b n
     
 
  
     (38) 
 
where the apex, e.g. RTM/RTM indicates the case of duopoly. Further substitutions 
lead to the following equilibrium outcomes 
 
 / (2 )(2 )
(3 2 )[4 2 (1 )]
RTM RTM
i
b n a w
q
n n b n
   

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2
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(3 2 )[4 2 (1 )]
RTM RTM
i
b b n a w
V
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for , 1,2i j  , and 
 
 
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/
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(3 2 ) [4 2 (1 )]
RTM RTM n b n a wCS
n n b n
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 
2 2
/
2 2
2(2 )(2 ) [( 2) (8 2 ) 8)
(3 2 ) [4 2 (1 )]
RTM RTM n b a w b n b n bSW
n n b n
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
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3.2. Duopoly with Efficient Bargaining institution. 
 
In the presence of the efficient bargaining institution, each firm-union pair maximises 
the following generalised Nash product, 
      
11
( ( ))
b bb b
i i i i j i j i i iN V a w q q n y y q w w q

            , 1,2i j         (44)  
 
Thus, each firm – union pair negotiates 1) in the case of SEB, first iw  and then iq ; 2) 
in the case of EB, simultaneously iw  and iq . 
 
3.2.1.  Sequential Efficient Bargaining 
 
In the last stage, the  FOC of the efficient bargaining game between each firm and its 
union leads to the output level 
  
1
, , ( ) , 1,2
2
i i j j j i j iq y y q a q n y y w i j
b
       
. (45) 
     
    From (45), after imposing the “rational expectations” condition, we obtain the 
output level for given iw : 
 
(1 ) (2 ) (1 ) )
( . ) , 1,2
(1 )(3 2 )
i j
i j
a b n b w n w
q w w i j
b n b
        
  
   (46) 
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In the first stage, after substitution of (46) in (44), the usual maximisation procedure 
w.r.t. iw  leads to  
 
2
/
(1 ) [( 4) (1 ))] 2 (2 )
, , 1,2
2(2 )
jSEB SEB
i
ab b b w b n w w n w n
w i j i j
b n
        
  
 
(47) 
 
Solving for iw  the system of eq. in (47), the equilibrium wages are  
 
/ (1 ) [ (4 )] 2 (2 ) , 1,2
[(4 2 ) (3 )]
SEB SEB
i
ab b bw b n w n
w i j
n b n
      
 
  
   (48) 
 
and, consequently, the equilibrium outcomes are 
 
 / (2 )(2 )
(3 2 )[(4 2 ) (3 )]
SEB SEB
i
b b n a w
q
b n n b n
    

    
    (49) 
 
 
22 2
/
2 2
(1 )(2 ) (2 )
(3 2 ) [(4 2 ) (3 )]
SEB SEB
i
b b b n a w
b n n b n

     

    
   (50) 
 
 
2
/
2
(1 )(2 )(2 )
(3 2 )[(4 2 ) (3 )]
SEB SEB
i
b b b b n a w
V
b n n b n
     

    
   (51) 
 
for , 1,2i j  , and 
 
22 2
/
2 2
2(1 )(2 ) (2 )
(3 2 ) [(4 2 ) (3 )]
SEB SEB n b b n a wCS
b n n b n
     

    
   (52) 
         
 
2 2 2 2
/
2 2
2(2 )(2 ) [2 ( 3) 2( 2) ]
(3 2 ) [(4 2 ) (3 )]
SEB SEB b b n a w b b n nSW
b n n b n
        

    
      (53) 
 
3.2.2.  Simultaneous Efficient Bargaining  
 
From the system of FOCs of the EB game in each firm/union pair, we obtain: 
  
1
, , ( )
2
i i j i j i j iq y y w a q n y y w
b
      
, , , 1,2i j i j   (54) 
 
  , , , (1 ) [ ( )]i i j i j i j i jw y y q q w b b a q q n y y        , , , 1,2i j i j   (55) 
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After imposing the “rational expectations” condition , 1,2i iy q i  , and solving the 
system (54)-(55), we obtain the following wage and output, respectively: 
 
/
3 2
EB EB
i
a w
q
n
 


 , , 1,2i j      (56) 
 
/ (3 2 )
3 2
EB EB
i
ab w n b
w
n
   


, , 1,2i j     (57) 
 
Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes are 
    
 
2
/
2
(1 )
(3 2 )
EB EB
i
b a w
n

  


      (58) 
 
        
2
/
2
( )
(3 2 )
EB EB
i
b a w
V
n
 


               (59) 
 
for , 1,2i j  , and 
 
 
2
/
2
2(1 )
(3 2 )
EB EB n a wCS
n
  


     (60) 
 
 
2
/
2
2(2 )
(3 2 )
EB EB n a wSW
n
  


     (61) 
 
3.3 The selection of the agenda as barrier to entry and welfare considerations 
 
Following the reasoning of Bughin (1999) and Buccella (2011), in the case of threat 
of entry with ‘‘committed bargaining’’, the incumbent firm ( )M can strategically use 
the bargaining agenda as an entry deterrence tool. In fact, if the fixed costs the entrant 
has to face are such that 
 
/ / , /
1 1
RTM M SEB SEB EB EBE   (Case A), / / , /
1 1
SEB M RTM RTM EB EBE   (Case B), 
/ / , /
1 1
EB M RTM RTM SEB SEBE     (Case C).        (62) 
 
where 1
M  are the monopoly profits, the incumbent firm may commit to a particular 
agenda to deter market entry.  
Let us first consider that the firm has the right to choose the negotiation agenda. With 
the payoffs’ in eqs. (9), (18), (26), (40), (50) and (58), it is possible to construct 
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Figure 2 below, where the monopoly profits are compared with the duopoly profits    
under the three agendas in relation to Cases A, B and C in eq. (62). It can be 
immediately observed that, in all the three cases, the monopolist can use the 
bargaining agenda to prevent entry in a certain areas of the parameter space: in Case 
A, the red area; in Case B, the blue area; and in Case C, the green area. A straight 
forward closer inspection reveals that those areas cover the overall relevant parameter 
space. The latter observation has the following striking consequence. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Plot of the monopoly and duopoly firm profits in Eq.(62) under the RTM, EB 
and SEB institution outcome in [n,b]-space .  
Legend: The graphs are drawn for a=1, w°=0. Note: duopoly profits under EB are 
always the lowest in Cases A and B.  
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Fig. 3. Bargaining agendas as potential entry deterrence tools in [n,b]-space .  
Legend: The graphs are drawn for a=1, w°=0. 
 
Result 5 Whenever the fixed costs of the initial investment for the potential entrant 
are sufficiently large, the monopolist can always use the bargaining agenda as a 
strategic tool to prevent market entry.  
 
Therefore, in a monopoly with network effect, the incumbent firm can switch among 
the bargaining agendas to deter entry; in other words, entry is not allowed.  
From the results in Fig.2 and the threshold 21 (1 )b n    in Result 1, it is possible to 
build Fig. 3, which is characterized by six regions. 
In region I, / / , /
1 1
RTM M SEB SEB EB EB  : when the union bargaining power is high, RTM may 
block the entry of a competitor under the alternative EB and SEB at all level of the 
network effect. 
In region II, we have that / / , /
1 1
RTM M SEB SEB EB EB  , / / , /
1 1
SEB M RTM RTM EB EB   and 
/ / , /
1 1
EB M SEB SEB RTM RTM  . In other words, every agenda may be used by the incumbent to 
deter the entry under the alternative options for medium/low unions’ bargaining 
power. The choice of the monopolist about the precise agenda to be used depends on 
the size of the fixed costs. However, given that for 0b  , / / /
1 1 1
,SEB M RTM M EB M    , 
when the fixed cost are low, the selection of the EB agenda can be more effective 
than SEB and RTM to prevent entry because it reduces the industry’s profitability. In 
region III, / / , /
1 1
SEB M RTM RTM EB EB  : SEB is the agenda that, in the presence of strong 
network effects, may block the entry of a competitor under the alternative EB and 
RTM. 
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Region IV has the following characteristics: / / , /
1 1
SEB M RTM RTM EB EB   and 
/ / , /
1 1
RTM M SEB SEB EB EB  . Therefore, SEB and RTM can be used to deter entry under EB. 
However, it occurs that the SEB agenda can deter entry under RTM and vice versa. In 
fact, a closer inspection reveals that / / / / /
1 1 1 1 1
SEB M RTM M SEB SEB RTM RTM EB EB     . Again, 
the choice of the agenda to deter entry depends on the magnitude of the fixed costs. 
The reasoning applied to region II also works here: when the fixed cost are small 
enough, the selection of the RTM agenda can be more effectual than SEB to deter 
market entry because it lowers the entrant’s profitability. 
Region V is similar to region IV, except for the fact that 
/ / / / /
1 1 1 1 1
SEB M RTM M RTM RTM SEB SEB EB EB     . The discussion presented in region IV and 
the core results apply also in this region. 
In region VI we have again that / / , /
1 1
SEB M RTM RTM EB EB   and / / , /
1 1
RTM M SEB SEB EB EB  ; 
however, / / / / /
1 1 1 1 1
RTM M SEB M RTM RTM SEB SEB EB EB     : when the fixed cost for the 
potential competitor are sufficiently small, now the selection of the SEB agenda can 
be more effective than RTM to prevent entry. 
Let us discuss, for matter of comparison, the cases without network effects ( 0)n  . 
From Case A in Fig. 2, it is immediately observed that / / , /
1 1
RTM M SEB SEB EB EB  : RTM 
always ensures the highest profits against the duopoly outcomes under SEB and EB. 
It follows that the monopolist does not use the bargaining agenda to deter entry. On 
the other hand, in Case B and C in Fig. 2, simple calculations shows that, for .73b  , 
/ / /
1 1 1
SEB M EB M RTM RTM   , and therefore the monopolist can commit to SEB and EB to 
deter a potential entry with RTM (Fanti and Buccella, 2015) 
At this point of the discussion, it can be of interest to check if the unionised 
monopolist with network effects could be potentially able to use the negotiation 
agendas to prevent entry. In this respect, we compare the former situations with the 
case where the incumbent firm becomes non-unionised and faces the presence of a 
potential non-unionised competitor. 
To do so, we compare the monopoly profits in the presence of unions under RTM, 
SEB and EB with the duopoly profits where both firms pay the competitive wage. 
The latter profits can be immediately derived by inserting eq. (30) and (35) after 
replacing iw  and jw  with w , into eq. (31), and are equal to 
 
2
No Union
2
, 1,2
(3 2 )
i
a w
i
n

 
 

.  
Figure 4 shows graphically the results. If the union bargaining power is not too high 
(simple algebra leads to the result of  .55b  ), it is evident that the monopolist can use 
each agenda to prevent entry for every degree of intensity of  the network effects. 
Once again, the choice of the agenda to be used crucially depends on the exact size of 
the fixed costs of the initial investment the entrant has to face. However, with RTM 
and EB, as the network intensity increases and the union power decreases, the entry 
deterrence effect weakens. 
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Fig. 4 Plots of the Unionised Monopoly profits and Non-unionized Duopoly profits in 
[n,b]-space . Legend: The graphs are drawn for a=1, w°=0. 
 
On the other hand, under the SEB agenda, a different result holds: as the network 
intensity increases and the union power increases, the entry deterrence effect 
strengthens. As a consequence of these findings about the role played by the presence 
of unions on the entry outcomes, the following Remarks hold. 
 
Remark 1. If the labour unions are sufficiently weak, a monopolist, rather 
paradoxically, may find strategically advantageous to unionise its labour force to 
deter the entry of a potential non-unionised competitor in the industry.  
 
Remark 2. In an industry with the presence of positive network externalities, if the 
labour market is not unionised, the incumbent firm has no instrument available to 
deter market.  
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Consider now the endogenous agreement as regards the negotiation agenda. Lemma 3 
and Result 2 also hold true in the present context. Thus, in the presence of sufficiently 
intense network effects, the monopolist and its union endogenously selects the SEB 
agenda.  
 
3.4.  Welfare effects of the entry game 
 
Let us finally consider the welfare effects of the entry game with committed 
bargaining.
3
 Given the relevant payoffs in eq. (12), (21), (29), (43), (53) and (61), it is 
possible to build the Figure 5 below.  
A straight forward analytical and graphical inspection of Fig. 5 leads to the following 
result.  
 
Result 6  Duopoly under SEB is always the socially Pareto-superior outcome. 
 
The SEB agenda is the institution that ensures the highest social welfare level under 
duopoly; however, from the discussion of Fig. 3, the SEB agenda can be 
endogenously selected to deter market entry only in a restricted area.  
The following result immediately holds.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Plot of the Social Welfare level functions in [n,b]-space . 
Legend: The graph is drawn for a=1, w°=0. Note: the graph is monochrome  because 
the Social Welfare under duopoly with the SEB agenda is always the highest in the 
relevant [n,b]-space . 
 
                                                 
3
 The analysis of entry in an industry without unions and the relative effects on social welfare have been analysed in the 
literature, inter alias, by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Cellini et al. (2004).   
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Fig. 6. Plot of the area where monopoly with SEB institution prevents the socially 
Pareto-superior outcome in [n,b]-space . 
Legend: The curves are drawn for a=1, w°=0. For all {n, b} combinations such that 
2(2 )
( )
4
n
b b b n
n

  

, where ( )b b n  is an expression analytically not manageable, 
SEB
 
 prevents the socially Pareto-superior outcome.  
 
 
Result 7. Provided that the both the network effect and union bargaining power are 
sufficiently low, a monopoly under the SEB arrangement is the endogenous market 
structure, and prevents the achievement of the Pareto-superior outcome.  
 
The proof follows from Lemmas 1 and 3 and Results 1, 2, 5 and 6 and discussion of 
Fig.3. Fig. 6 depicts the area in the {n, b}-space where Result 7 applies.  
The consequences in terms of social welfare are as follows. In an industry 
characterised by positive network externalities, if the monopolist have the right of 
choosing the negotiation agenda, a government interested in guaranteeing the highest 
overall social welfare level has no clear-cut solution. In fact, as discussed above, the 
monopolist can shift from one bargaining agenda to another to prevent market entry, 
and the strategic choice of the precise agenda critically depends on the size of the 
fixed cost for the potential competitor. This may entail that policy maker should 
know many information not easily available and it may turn into an extremely 
complex task. However, in the case of endogenous bargaining agenda selection, the 
policy recommendation is less complicated. In fact, the government should promote 
the choice of a SEB agenda in negotiations which ensures the overall highest welfare 
level. However, one may argue that, as Fig. 6 shows, there is an area of the parameter 
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space where SEB is the endogenous bargaining agenda in monopoly and, at the same 
time, it prevents the achievement of the socially desirable welfare level. Nonetheless, 
it can be checked that in that area, the social welfare under monopoly with SEB is the 
“second-best” 4 outcome, with a welfare level higher than the duopoly under RTM 
and EB. In the overall, the choice of a SEB agenda would always remain the socially 
preferred one.  
 
4 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have examined the issue of the bargaining agenda in the presence of 
network goods in a unionised monopoly. We have shown that the monopolist’s 
preferred agenda, i.e. RTM or SEB or EB, depends crucially on the strength of the 
network externality. While the conventional result (without network goods) is that 
profits are always higher under RTM than EB arrangement (and both sequential and 
simultaneous EB yield the same outcome), we show that, with network externalities, 
the monopolist prefers SEB, especially if the union’s power is low. We argue that this 
result is due to the sequential negotiation for which the consumers’ expectations on 
the market size are already realised in the long-run, that is, in the first stage of wage 
determination.
5
 Moreover, since the union always prefers SEB (with or without 
network effects), it follows that the traditional conflict of interests between parties 
may be resolved in the presence of network externalities. Moreover, such an agenda 
also implies a Pareto superior equilibrium (i.e., the welfare of monopolist, workers, 
consumers and the entire society is the highest).  
We have also investigated the threat of market entry in the industry under the 
“committed bargaining”, focusing separately on the cases in which the firm choose 
unilaterally the agenda or the agenda is endogenously selected by both firm and union. 
We have shown that, if the firm can choose the negotiation agenda, depending on the 
strength of the network externality and the union bargaining power, the incumbent 
may commit either to every agenda to deter market entry. However, the precise 
agenda the monopolist would like to adopt to prevent entry crucially depends on the 
size of the fixed costs the competitor has to face. Therefore, the monopolist may 
always strategically use the bargaining agenda as a deterrence tool. This means that 
every labour market arrangement is a sufficient device to raise effective barriers to 
entry. This finding contributes to the literature on the entry barriers, arguing that the 
labour market institutions add to the other known devices used as a barrier (i.e. 
capacity investment, patents, limit prices and so on) in network goods industries. 
On the other hand, in the case of endogenous selection, the monopolist and its union 
agree on the SEB to prevent entry, provided that the network effects are intense and 
                                                 
4
 Of course the highest social welfare would be achieved with duopoly under SEB, as shown in 
Result 6. 
5
 In fact, in the case of EB, where the wage and employment are simultaneously determined, the 
consumers’ expectations are not so far realised. Consequently, the conventional result that a 
monopolist prefers RTM still holds. 
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the union power adequately high. As regards the welfare effects of the entry game, 
we have shown that the social welfare in duopoly under SEB is the Pareto-superior 
outcome. However, since the SEB institution itself can be used as entry deterrent tool 
for intense network effects and strong unions, then a monopoly under SEB emerges 
as the endogenous market structure and prevents the most desirable welfare level, but 
also in such a case welfare is higher than under RTM and EB. An interesting 
extension of this analysis could be to relax the assumption of monopoly firm. A 
reasonable further step would be to analyse whether a monopoly firm should hire a 
manager to bargain with the union and, if it is the case, how the findings of this paper 
may change. Finally the entry game should be extended allowing for the “flexible” 
commitment.  
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